# Cryptpad

### An Open-Source Encrypted Collaborative Office Suite

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XWiki (CryptPad)



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- ► CryptPad is a dedicated software for collaborative document editing
- ► More than that: a collaborative office suite


























Issue: the broadcast server knows everything

#### Trust Issues

























#### Limitations of this Model

Limitation: the server knows metadata (IPs, connection patterns...)

#### NACH G7-LEAK: POLIZEI LEGT ÖFFENTLI-CHE PIRATENPARTEI-INFRASTRUKTUR LAHM

24. IUNI 2022



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### It's Free and Open-Source Software

#### Kerckhoff's principle

A cryptosystem should be secure, even if everything about the system, except the secret keys, is public knowledge.

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#### ► AGPLv3 License:

The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.

The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change all versions of a program—to make sure it remains free software for all its users.

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► AGPLv3 License: you can reuse and modify our code, but users must have access to the source code they are running.

#### Threat Model

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- ► The server is a passive adversary (honest-but-curious)
  - Cannot do much if it serves a different code
  - Administrators can always delete a file
- ► We want to protect users' data even if the server becomes corrupt

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- ► Conflicts management
- Secure communications
- User-friendliness

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**Relations:** • and ▶ are separated while ■ depends on •

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- ► A broadcast protocol: Netflux
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  - The server relays messages in the same order to everyone
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- No offline editing is possible (read-only remains possible)
- Storage: ChainPad
  - Documents are a list of patches + checkpoints
  - Everything is a document

- ► Identification
  - Authenticated public-key encryption keys (pk, sk), and a symmetric encryption key k are derived from username + password


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- ► Edit a document
  - (editKeyStr || pwd) is used to derive a document key  $k_d$  and a document signature key pair  $(vk_d, sk_d)$
  - $\blacksquare$  Encrypt a patch of your change under  $k_d$
  - $\blacksquare$  Sign the patch under  $vk_d$  and send it to the server

- ► Right managements
  - To share a read-only document, share only  $k_d$  + URL. As the receiver doesn't have  $sk_d$ , it cannot send modifications
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- ► Share a document
  - To a registered user
    - Encrypt keys + URL under respective receivers' *pk*s
    - Use of Netflux to send it to respective receivers
  - To anyone
    - Generate URL with keys suffixed after a # sign


### A Special Case: Forms



Forms are made of two documents in one, with linked right management:

- ► Questions
- Answers

### Forms: Our Solution



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- ► Moderation issues
- ► No full-text search
- ► Cannot search a user from its username

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Possible future solution: key rotation

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- ▶ Drawback: break anonymous access to new versions of the document

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**Drawback:** not a very used method nowadays, UI/UX need some works to have something usable


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- ► That can be solved with more cryptography
- ► Real world limitations:
  - Computational ressources (especially in mobile device)
  - Scalability
  - Libraries in javascript
  - Reliance on web browsers

## Demo



#### **Future Works**

- ► Formalise the security of cryptpad
  - Provide an API
    - Lighter dependency on browsers
    - Provide synchronised storage
  - Post-quantum migration
- ► Implement & Deploy the above QoL improvements
  - nlnet Blueprints project: https://nlnet.nl/project/CryptPad-Blueprints/
- Security enhancement
  - Forward secrecy
  - Security against actively malicious servers

## Questions?



► https://cryptpad.org

► https://cryptpad.fr for our public instance